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Abstract. Cryptocurrencies came to the world in the recent decade and attempted to offer a new
order where the financial system is not governed by a centralized entity, and where you have complete
control over your account without the need to trust strangers (governments and banks above all). How-
ever, cryptocurrency systems face many challenges that prevent them from being used as an everyday
coin. In this paper we attempt to take one step forward by introducing a cryptocurrency system that
has many important properties. Perhaps the most revolutionary property is its deterministic operation
over a fully asynchronous communication network, which has sometimes been mistakenly considered
to be impossible. By avoiding any temporal assumptions, we get a system that is robust against arbi-
trary delays in the network, and whose latency is only a function of the actual communication delay.
The presented system is based on familiar concepts – banking and democracy. Our banks, just like
normal banks, keep their clients’ money and perform their clients’ requests. However, because of the
cryptographic scheme, your bank cannot do anything in your account without your permission and
its entire operation is transparent so you don’t have to trust it blindly. The democracy means that
every operation performed by the banks (e.g., committing a client transaction) has to be accepted by a
majority of the coin holders, in a way that resembles representative democracy where the banks are the
representatives and where each client implicitly delegates his voting power (the sum of money in his
account) to his bank. A client can switch banks at any moment, by simply applying a corresponding
request to the new bank of his choice. The presented approach employs the advantages of centraliza-
tion while still providing a completely trustless and decentralized system. By employing concepts from
everyday life and attaining high throughput and low latency for committing transactions, the hope is
that this paper will lay the foundations for a cryptocurrency that can be truly used as a practical coin
on a daily basis.
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1 Introduction
In its most basic form, cryptocurrency is a digital coin accompanied by cryptographic tools that
provide several benefits. In a digital coin, your money is just a number (the amount of money
you have). In today’s world, these numbers are usually kept by the banks. As a result, you have
to trust your bank, as it is the only entity that can tell how much money you have (and whom
you must address in order to use this money). On the contrary, in the common cryptocurrency
scheme the idea is to deploy a decentralized and trustless system where there is no single entity
that can be trusted to tell you how much money you (or someone else) have. Instead, the amount of
money you have should be determined by consensus among the other users of the cryptocurrency –
everyone should agree, somehow, that you have that specific amount of money. Moreover, this vague
consensus should be reached regarding all the transactions (money transfers) that are committed.
This is required in order to prevent double spending, where one can use the same coin more than
once, without its recipients knowing this. Once there is a consensus on a payment, the corresponding
recipient can be sure that he received the money (because everyone agrees that the money is his).
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A second payment with the same coin will not be accepted, as the corresponding (second) recipient
will see that the payment is not in the consensus. The big question is how can you reach such
consensus in a setting where you can trust no one, and where it is not generally defined who the
other players are. This is also known as the “Consensus in the Permissionless Model” problem [15].
Bitcoin emerged in 2008 [14] offering a solution to this problem and putting the cryptocurrency
in the headlines. However, despite its glorious success (for the moment), Bitcoin has many known
flaws. Among its flaws are the time it takes a transaction to be accepted [11], its limited transactions
throughput [16], and finally, the great energy consumption involved in keeping it alive. There are
numerous works and other cryptocoins that are trying to fix these flaws. Especially, there are
strong environmental and economical reasons to alleviate its energy consumption that follows from
its innovative mechanism for solving the “Consensus in the Permissionless Model” problem. More
information concerning Bitcoin and other protocols appears in Section 2.
The common denominator for probably all of the numerous different cryptocoins is that there
are roughly two groups – users and administrators. The users are the simple persons/clients that
want to hold coins and use them for any type of trade or investment. Each user has a matching
pair of secret and public keys, where the public key is the user’s “account number”, and the secret
key is used by the user for creating digital signatures. The administrators’ role is to make sure
that there is consensus concerning the current balance of the user accounts and concerning the
committed user transactions. An admin can be represented by a matching pair of secret and public
keys, just like the users. The set of admins might be well defined in advance, in which case we
say it is a permissioned settings. Otherwise, everyone can be an admin (a permissionless settings).
The administrators must invest resources such as computation, storage and bandwidth in order to
manage the consensus, so it might be not suitable to simple users. As a revenue for their efforts,
the admins receive coins – either by commission from transactions, or by creating money from thin
air, i.e., stamping new money. The coin they receive plays a double role – it provides both revenue
for their investment, and an incentive to keep the stability of the coin, as otherwise the coin’s value
will drop and the administrators’ true gain will decrease as well (the coins they will receive shall
have lower value).
When a user wants to transfer money from his account to another, he creates a transaction that
contains the required information, attaches to it a matching digital signature, and sends it to one or
more administrators. The admins should make sure that the transfer is “legal”, and if it does, they
accept it. Accepting a transaction means that the money transfer described by the transaction was
executed (so, from now on, the money belongs to the recipient). A transaction that was accepted
by one admin should be eventually accepted by all the admins. By applying the set of accepted
transactions, we can compute how much money each user holds – the sum of money he received
minus the sum of money he transferred. Clearly that balance must be non-negative. In Section 3
we introduce a formal, and reasonable, definition for the cryptocurrency problem.
Following the above discussion, there must be consensus regarding the accepted transactions.
We should be careful, however, when using the word consensus. In distributed computing theory,
the consensus problem [4] involves a set of nodes, each holding an input value, and the nodes
must all agree on a single input value (an input value of one of the nodes). This is similar to
our case in cryptocurrency, where finally all nodes (admins) should agree which transactions have
been accepted (where a user might send conflicting transactions to different nodes). Many works on
cryptocurrency (e.g. [3,12,19,20]) mention the FLP impossibilty result [7] that states that consensus
cannot be solved when the communication channels between the nodes are asynchronous, and where
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nodes might fail (by stopping to respond). A communication channel is considered asynchronous
if a message that is sent over the channel can suffer an arbitrary delay. Following the FLP result,
it might be deduced that a (deterministic) cryptocurrency system cannot assume asynchronous
communications. The first immediate result presented in this paper shows that this is wrong. In
Section 4 we define a deterministic system that solves the cryptocurrency problem that is defined in
Section 3, and does so over asynchronous communication network. It follows that the cryptocurrency
problem is not as hard as the classical consensus problem. The crucial difference between the two
problems is in the way we deal with conflicting values/transactions. In the classical consensus
problem, if there is a set of conflicting values, the nodes must accept on a single value out of the
conflicting ones. In cryptocurrency, transactions are conflicting when a user attempts to double
spend – pay the same coin twice. In such a case, we claim that we don’t have to accept one of the
conflicting transactions – we can reject them both. Rejecting both conflicting transactions makes
sense, as such conflicting transactions result from invalid behavior of a user. Irresponsible users
should be aware that their transactions might be rejected.
In order to take advantage of the fact that cryptocurrency is easier to solve than consensus, we
cannot use blockchain based solutions. A blokchain is basically an ordered list of all the accepted
transactions. The order of the list is accepted by everyone. Agreeing on such a total order is as
hard as solving the classical consensus problem [5], and so it is unsolvable under asynchronous
communications according to the FLP. While convenient, total order of the transactions is not
necessary. For example, if Alice transfers $20 to Charlie, and Bob transfers $30 to Charlie, there is
no importance which transfer comes first.
Note that most if not all the existing cryptocoins operate using asynchronous communication
channels. However, none of them is known to meet the requirements we define (and particularly
those that are blockchain based cannot meet the requirements). More precisely, many of the existing
cryptocoins operate in non determinisitc fashion, and so they can meet the requirements we define
with high probablity. However, they often trade latency for safety – the probability for success goes
higher as we wait more time before accepting a transaction [14]. Such latency is clearly unwanted.
As the cryptocurrency problem involves some sort of (weaker) consensus, and consensus is
roughly achieved when the majority accepts on something, we need to find a way to define majority.
Algorithms that operate in permissioned settings are usually based on the number of existing nodes.
E.g., if more than two thirds of the nodes accepts a transaction, then it can be considered accepted.
In permissionless settings, the number of nodes is not known and is not relevant, as everyone
can produce arbitrary number of nodes. Instead, a resource that cannot be easily replicated must
be used. Arguably the most common resource that is used is computation power, as in Bitcoin.
Another common option, that we shall employ, is to use the coin itself. In the following subsection
we describe our permissionless approach for solving the cryptocurrency problem.
1.1 Banking and Democracy
Recall that the administrators are the ones that manage the consensus, concerning the existing
balance and accepted transactions. However, we claim that the consensus should be between the
users. I.e., it is the users who should be interested in the consensus. Without consensus there is no
value to the coins they hold, as there is no agreement on the amount of coins each user holds. The
more coins you hold, the more responsibility you have for the cryptocurrency’s future, as you will
lose more if its value will drop. The way we can coordinate between all the different users is by
means of democracy – letting the majority of the “people” decide. However, the “people” in our
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case will not be the users, bur rather the coins. As coins belong to users, we will provide each user
with voting power that is proportional to the amount of coins he owns. The problem is that the
users are too numerous, and asking all of them to vote on each decision (i.e., transaction) is not
practical. Recall that in a democracy the people don’t need to accept every rule, they just need to
choose representatives to make the decisions for them (or on their behalf). Thus, our users simply
need to choose representatives. The most trivial representatives are the administrators, whose job
is to maintain the consensus. We shall now discuss the identities of the administrators.
In the real world we don’t keep the money ourselves (at least most of our money). Instead, we
let someone – the bank, to keep it for us. When we want to use this money we simply address our
bank (either directly or indirectly1). In cryptocurrency, on the other hand, the amount of money
you have is decided by agreement between the admins. The advantage in such a scheme is that
you are not depended on a single bank but rather on the agreement between multiple admins.
Moreover, the operations of the admins are completely transparent and, in fact, each of us can
become an admin (or at least can gather the information that they get) and check for himself the
correctness of the consensus. Yet, there is some convenience in the banks scheme where each user
has a single address to all of his requests (convenient both for the user and for the entire system).
Our solution merges the responsibilities of everyday banks and cryprocurrency admins by making
the admins to function as banks. Each user will choose a bank (an administrator) where his money
will be deposited, and whom he should directly address for every request. Of course the user must
also have the option to switch banks, so he won’t lose his money in case his bank fails or otherwise
ignores his requests. A bank, just like a user, will have a pair of secret and public keys. The user’s
account number will be the combination of his bank’s public key and his own public key. The bank’s
public key can be seen as the “branch number”, while the user’s public key is the “inner account
number” in that specific bank.
Let’s assume I ask my bank to transfer money from my account to another. As we are living
in a democracy, the transfer must be accepted by the holders of the majority of the coin (i.e., a
group of coin holders that together possess a majority of the money must accept this transfer). In
our approach, each bank represents its clients and ‘votes’ on their behalf. Roughly speaking, each
bank gets its voting power according to the sum of money in the user accounts it manages. Once
the banks agree on a transaction, we can see it as if the money holders themselves agreed on that
transaction (as each money holder delegated his voting power to his bank). We shall now briefly
describe the implemented protocol. In blockchain based coins there is a single global ledger (the
blockchain) that lists all the transactions, and all the admins (should) agree on this ledger. In our
system every admin shall have a private blockchain of its own, that lists (mostly) the transactions
its clients committed. That blockchain might also include a transaction of a user of another bank,
in case that user asks to leave his original bank and move to this bank. If we want to compute the
balance of a client, observing only the blockchain of his bank is not enough, as it doesn’t list money
that he receives from clients of other banks. The information about such money transfers is found
in the blockchains of the other banks (the banks whose clients transferred that money). As banks
must be able to compute such account balances, they must hold all of the existing blockchains. In
fact, each block in a given blockchain will contain pointers to blocks in other blockchains. More
information appears in Section 4.1.
The presented approach includes many advantages. Among else it presents a completely decen-
tralized and trustless system, an agreement mechanism without superfluous energy consumption
1 Most often we address our credit card company, and they address our bank.
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and a deterministic cryptocurrency that operates over asynchronous channels and (theoretically)
achieves low latency. From the user side, just as in real life, you address all of your requests directly
to your bank. The banks have incentives to give their clients good service, for otherwise the clients
will move to other banks (and less clients means less income).
2 Related Works
Maybe the greatest challenge of cryptocurrency is reaching consensus on the money balance and/or
committed transactions. The most prominent approach to this problem, introduced by Bitcoin [14],
is the famous blockchain. The difficult question is how a new block is added to a given chain, in
such a way that everyone will agree that this block is indeed the next block in the chain. Bitcoin’s
approach is to do so by a race based on computational power. The chance one has to win such
a race is roughly equal to its computation power divided by the overall computation power that
participate in this race. A winner of a race manages to create a block that will be accepted by
everyone. This concept is called Proof-of-Work (PoW). The great downside of PoW is its resource
consumption.2 In order to alleviate the resource consumption, the idea of Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [10]
was introduced, where instead of deciding the next block by stochastic means, based on ownership
of external resources (such as computation power), we can decide it based on inherent resources –
the coin itself. The idea is that if you have more of the coin, you can get the chances to create more
blocks. In our case we use the coin as a voting power, that is delegated by its holders to their banks,
and where transactions are accepted by majority of the voting power. Delegating voting power is
not new [13,1,2]. The advantages of delegating the voting power is that we can apply consensus by
‘democracy’, where the coin holders are effectively those that decide. Maybe the most prominent
problem in delegating power is the indifferent user. The problem is when users don’t really care to
whom they delegate their power. The result might be that most of the honest users delegate their
power to non functioning or malicious administrators, or even don’t delegate their power at all (in
which case the rest of the users, many of whom might have malicious intentions, effectively have
more power than their fair share). In our approach, the users cannot truly be indifferent. Our users
must choose a bank, and as they can get service only from that bank, they cannot delegate their
voting power to a bank that is not functioning or that was proved to be malicious (a bank that
acts maliciously will be ignored by the rest of the banks, so it won’t be able to give services to its
users).
Regardless the method been used to overcome the permissionless settings, using a blockchain
results in relatively low throughput and high latency. The reason for this problem is that, effectively,
only one admin at a time can add a new block to the chain, which causes great congestion. In order
to solve this problem, one option is to do things outside the main chain (e.g. [16]), and update
the main chain only when necessary (less frequent updates shall lead to less congestion). Another
option, however, is to completely avoid a main blockchain. While blockchain has the convenient
feature that it defines a total order over all the committed transactions, this convenience comes
with a great cost, and is not truly necessary. However, we still need some sort of partial order. For
example, if Alice wishes to transfer some money to Bob, we want to see that Alice received enough
money before that, so she indeed has enough money in her account to perform that transfer.
2 It should be mentioned though that the requirement for resource consumption plays another important role – it
makes the option to alter history unlikely, as one has to invest more resources than all the resources that have
been used, starting from the point of required change in history.
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For keeping only partial order, we can use a DAG (directed acyclic graph). For example, each
of [17,13,18,8,3] uses some sort of a DAG (implicitly or explicitly).
Instead of agreeing on a single blockchain, the admins will agree on this graph (the DAG).
Each node in the graph can contain user transactions, similar to a block in the blockchain. Maybe
the simplest use of DAG is as a set of parallel blockchains that are connected between them. For
example, every admin can have a blockchain of its own (a chain of blocks that all of them belong to
that admin), and every block in such a blockchain can reference blocks from blockchains of other
admins (e.g., the “gossip” graph in [3]). In such case there is no competition between admins, and
no congestion, as every admin can freely create new blocks in its own chain. However, the problem is
that conflicting transactions might appear on different blockchains, in blocks that have been created
concurrently. Conflicting transactions are transactions that cannot be applied together. E.g., if Alice
has $40 and she issues two transactions in which she transfer $20 to Bob and $30 to Charlie, then
clearly the two transactions cannot both take effect. When using a single blockchain this was easy
– one of the two transactions had to appear before the other, so the second transaction would
become invalid. But what should we do if these two transactions appear in two different blocks that
were added concurrently to a graph at two different locations? Different DAG-based cryptocoins
deal with such a problem in different ways. A simple solution is that transactions of the same
“type”, that might be conflicting, are allowed to be introduced only at a specific location in the
graph, so they cannot appear concurrently at different locations. E.g., if our graph is indeed a set
of parallel blockchains, then we can divide the transactions according to their source accounts, such
that transactions of a specific account are allowed to appear only in blocks of a specific blockchain
[13,8,6,9].
In the above paragraph we mentioned two possible properties for a DAG that is constructed
from parallel blockchains: (1) That there will be a separate blockchain for every admin, so there will
be no congestion, and (2) that conflicting transactions cannot be issued on different blockchains.
Combining both of these properties can have a good effect. However, if even one admin stops
responding, then certain transactions cannot be issued, which is clearly unacceptable. Another
option, of [13], is that instead of one for every admin, there is a blockchain for every user. This
could be ideal, if we could trust all the users. However, as a malicious user can create conflicting
blocks in its chain, there must be some sort of agreement on the actual blockchains.
Our solution maintains a blockchain for every admin(/bank), and users should submit transac-
tions to the specific admin they chose (their bank), so that conflicting transactions are not supposed
to appear in different blockchains. However, the users can also choose to submit a transaction to
another bank, when they want to transfer their account to that bank. Thus, it is not really guaran-
teed that there won’t be conflicting transactions (though, they should be less frequent – only when
users switch banks).
Arguably the strongest theoretical result that appears in this paper is that a deterministic
cryptocurrency ststem can be implemented over asynchronous communications. A similar idea
appears also in [9]. However, they assume that each account has a single process through which
it submits its transactions (i.e., a single admin), which is not practical, as users won’t be able use
their money if the only admin that can publish their transactions has stopped responding.
3 Model
We define a cryptocurrency system by the tuple (A, I,B, P ) where A is a set of possible account
numbers, I : A→ R≥0 defines an initial balance for each account, B is a set of possible admin IDs
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and P is the protocol that every admin should follow. A and B might be infinite sets. We assume
that each account number has a matching private key that can be used to create digital signatures
in a way that everyone can verify but no one can fake. Accordingly, computing a public key from a
private key should be easy but not vice versa. In permissioned settings, there would be |B| known
nodes, that each will have a specific ID from B. In permissionless settings, on the other hand, we
can assume that B, similarly to A, represents a set of public keys, that each has a matching private
key. In this paper we focus on permissionless settings.
A transaction is defined by (s, t,m, i, d) where s, t ∈ A are the source and destination accounts
respectively, m ∈ R+ is the amount of money to be transferred from s to t, i ∈ N is a sequence
number and d is a digital signature of (s, t,m, i) created using the private key of s. The first
transaction issued by s should have the sequence number i = 1, and the sequence number should be
increased by 1 for every following transaction. The sequence number has two uses: (1) It allows the
creation of two identical money transfers (transferring the same amount to the same destination),
and (2) It allows us to define below a simple requirements from the system.3
In every execution of the system, there are a set of nodes that act as users and admins. Every user
knows the private key of one or more accounts. Every admin has one or more distinct IDs from B.
During the execution, the users create transactions and send them to the admins. The admins can
send messages between them and accept transactions or reject them. Accepting a transaction means
that the money transfer described by the transaction was executed (so, from now on, the money
belongs to the recipient). A transaction that was rejected might be later accepted, but not vice
versa. I.e., accepting a transaction is irreversible. This is important, as the recipient of the money
might assume that he already got the money, and he might deliver some other good in return.
By applying the set of accepted transactions we can compute how much money each user holds –
his initial balance according to I plus the sum of money he received minus the sum of money he
transferred.
We use a permissionless settings, with asynchronous communications and byzantine crashes.
We say that an admin is valid if it follows the prescribed protocol and if it doesn’t crash. A formal
definition for executions under these settings appears in Appendix A. An execution is considered
valid if it satisfies the following properties:
– Agreement: A transaction accepted by a valid admin will be eventually accepted by all valid
admins.
– Positive Balance: At every time point, and for every valid admin, applying the set of trans-
actions that were accepted by that admin results in non-negative balance in all the accounts.
– Termination: Every transaction that is sent from a user to a valid admin must be eventually
either accepted or rejected by that admin.
– Rejection Restriction: A valid admin may reject a transaction (s, t,m, i, d) only if either (1)
there is an i′ ∈ N such that i′ < i and the admin didn’t accept any transaction of s with the
sequence number i′, (2) the user issued another transaction (s, t′,m′, i, d′) where either t 6= t′
or m 6= m′, or (3) the balance of the user (computed by applying all the transactions that were
accepted by this admin) is smaller than the amount to be transferred by the transaction.
The last requirement of rejection restriction is provided to avoid a trivial solution where all trans-
actions are rejected.
3 Alternatively, we could employ Bitcoin’s transaction mechanism, where each transaction consumes previous trans-
actions.
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4 Solution
We now describe a cryptocurrency system whose executions satisfy the requirements described in
Section 3 (under a specific assumption). In our system, every admin and every user hold a pair of
public and secret keys. Denote by B and C the set of possible public keys for admins and users
respectively (both might be infinite, possibly B = C). We define A = B×C to be the set of possible
account numbers. I.e., every account number is a combination of a user’s public key and an admin’s
public key. To the admins we call banks. An account number is said to belong to a specific user,
under a specific bank. A user should send his signed transactions to his own bank. If he wants to
switch banks, however, he should be able to submit to another bank – his new bank, a transaction
that transfers all his money to that bank. Moreover, there are cases where the user should be able
to resubmit to another bank the same transaction that he has already submitted to his original
bank. An example is if the original bank of the user has stopped responding after receiving that
transaction from the user, but before it managed to accept it. For simplicity, we assume that a user
can submit every transaction to every bank of his choice.4
In order to list the accepted transactions, different cryptocurrencies use different types of ledgers
that are maintained by the admins. The most famous ledger is the blockchain. On the contrary,
we use a ledger in the form of a DAG. We define that ledger in the subsection below, and in the
subsection that follows we describe the protocol P that a bank (admin) shall follow.
4.1 The Blockgraph
We now define the Blockgraph – a DAG that we use instead of a blockchain. In blockchain, every
block contains a set of accepted transactions, and the different blocks are “chained” one after the
other. In our blockgraph, every bank has such a chain of its own that contains only blocks that
were issued by that bank (they must be digitally signed by it). However, instead of blocks we
talk about nodes, where each block from the original blockchain is split into several nodes. The
beginning of a block is a start node that contains the transactions to be committed. A block ends
at an accept node. Between a pair of start node and accept node there might be additional nodes,
update nodes, that contain references to nodes in the chains of other banks. All the nodes between
a pair of consecutive start and accept nodes are considered as a single block. To define the initial
coin distribution (I), we use an init node. The init node contains a list of account numbers and a
positive amount of money for each account in the list. The list of accounts that appear in an init
node must be sorted, so that for every initial balance mapping I, there will be a unique matching
init node. See Figure 1 for an example of a blockgraph.
Each node in the graph (except the init node) contains the following information:
– The bank number that owns that node.
– The sequence number of the node in its bank’s chain.
– The hash of the previous node in its bank’s chain (its parent) or the hash of the init node if it
is the first node in the chain.
– A digital signature of the owner bank.
4 A more practical option is that a bank will accept a transaction from an external account only if either (1) an
account of it is the destination of the transaction, or (2) if that external user will attach another transaction that
transfers money to an account in this bank. This way that bank has an incentive to accept that transaction.
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Fig. 1. A blockgraph with an init node (bottom) and with
“blockchains” of three banks: B1, B2 and B3, where every
such blockchain is constructed by start nodes, update nodes
and accept nodes. Edges from nodes to their parents appear
in black, and edges from update nodes to their referenced
nodes in gray. Note that the first node of every blockchain
(the bottom node in every column) references the init node
as its parent. Dotted blue rectangles mark complete blocks
(a set of nodes from start node to accept node).
(B1,#1)
Start Node
TX 1
TX 2
TX 3
...
Hash(Init Node)
Transactions
Parent's hash
(bank ID, 
   node serial number)
(B1,#2)
Update Node
Hash(B2,#2)
Hash(B3,#1)
...
Hash(B1,#1)
References to nodes
of other banks
Init Node
 Account 1, $20
 Account 2, $33
...
Fig. 2. Nodes example. An init node (top left) de-
scribes an initial coin distribution, a start node (bot-
tom) lists issued transactions and an update node
(top right) references nodes of other banks. Note that
the parent of the start node (in this example) is the
init node, and the parent of the update node is the
start node.
Excluding the init node, there are three types of nodes. Each node might contain additional infor-
mation according to its type:
– A start node contains user transactions the bank wants to apply.
– An update node contains references to nodes of other banks.
– An accept node contains no additional information.
See Figure 2 for an example of nodes.
A bank creates a start node when it wants to publish transactions it received from its users. It
then sends the issued start node to the other banks. The other banks in return can create update
nodes that reference that start node. A reference to a node is basically its hash together with its
true id (the id of the bank that issued it, and that node’s sequence number in its bank’s chain).
When a bank creates such an update node, this means that it acknowledges the node it references.
Acknowledgment applies even with indirect references – every node acknowledges all the nodes that
are reachable from it (by means of paths in the graph). For example, in Figure 1, the top accept
node of B2 acknowledges all the nodes in the graph excluding the two top nodes of B3.
A bank that created a start node has to wait for other banks to acknowledge its start node,
so that this node will be in “consensus”. To show that other banks have indeed acknowledged its
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node, it has to acknowledge their acknowledgments. It does so by creating update nodes of its own,
that reference the update nodes of the other banks (directly or indirectly). Once enough banks have
acknowledged its original start node, and it has acknowledged those banks’ acknowledgments, that
bank can tell everyone to accept the transactions that are listed in this start node. It does so by
creating an accept node, that marks the end of the block. This accept node doesn’t need to contain
any additional information, as it is a complementary node to the original start node, and a new
start node cannot be issued before an accept node for the previous start node has been created.
We conclude this scheme by formally defining the structure of a blockgraph:
Definition 1 (Blockgraph). A graph G is considered a blockgraph if all of the following applies:
– Every node of G has to be a start node, accept node, update node or init node.
– There must be exactly one init node in G.
– The parent of every node, except the init node that has no parent, must also appear in G, and
it must belong to the same bank (unless the parent is the init node).
– For every update node in G, all its referenced nodes also appear in G.
– There is an edge from each node to its parent, and edges from each update node to its referenced
nodes. There must be no other edges in G.
– G has no cycles.5
– Let v be a node in G. We consider the (longest) sequence of nodes that starts at v and where
every other node in the sequence is the parent of its predecessor. Ignoring the init node and the
update nodes in this sequence, we must get an alternating sequence of start nodes and accept
nodes where the last node is a start node.
Note that the last condition means that a given bank shall have no accept node without a
matching start node that comes before it, and no start node that comes after another start node
without an accept node in the middle. update nodes can appear everywhere. A simple property of
blockgraphs that we shall use in the sequel is described in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let G be a blockgraph, and let G′ be a subgraph of G. If every node in G′ has the same
number of outgoing edges as in G, then G′ is also a blockgraph.
Proof. All the requirements of blockgraphs are trivially true for G′, except the second and last
requirements. We start with the last requirement. Let v be a node in G′. The parent of v also
appears in G′, as there is an outgoing edge from v to its parent. But then also the parent of v has
an edge to its own parent, and so on. Thus, we get the same sequence of nodes as in G, and so the
requirement must hold. Following the above case, that sequence of nodes must end at some point
(as there are no cycles in G′). The only node that has no parent is the init node. Thus, the init
node also appears in G′.
Before a bank accepts a node it received from another bank (by referencing it with an update
node), it must check its validity. Some of the conditions for validity are specific to the node’s type,
and some are general. We start with the general conditions.
Let v be a node. We say that a blockgraph G represents v if v appears in G, and if there
are paths in G from v to every other node in G. Recall that v contains references to other nodes
(their hashes) – a reference to its parent, and possibly references to nodes of other banks, if v is
5 A cycle means there is a cycle of cryptographic hash values, where each value is the hash of its previous, and we
assume that producing such a cycle is impossible.
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an update node. If we know those referenced nodes, then we can consider also the references that
they contain, and so on, until we have a complete blockgraph, which is exactly the representing
graph of v. If v has no representing graph, then it is clearly not valid (it references, directly or
indirectly, an impossible node). If v does have a representing graph, we assume it is unique because
the references each node has to other nodes are defined by cryptographic hash, and we assume
that it is impossible to create two different, valid, nodes with the same hash. Moreover, note that
such two nodes must both belong to the same bank and be with the same sequence number, and
possibly have additional requirements in order to fit in the right place in the graph.
Considering the representing blockgraph of v, we remove v from this graph, and to the resulting
graph we call the subgraph of v. Note that the representing graph contains no cycles (as it is a
blockgraph), so there could be no edge from another node to v in that graph. Thus, the conditions
of Lemma 1 applies for the subgraph of v, and so it is also a blockgraph. The subgraph of v is
considered valid only if all of its nodes are valid. If the subgraph of v is not valid, then v is not
valid.
Assuming that the subgraph of v is valid, we check v’s contents according to its type. If v is an
init node, then it is trivially valid. If v is an update node, then it could also be trivially valid, but
in order to avoid waste of information we should make sure that an update node doesn’t reference
nodes that are already appear in its parent’s subgraph. Later on in this section, we introduce an
additional requirement from update nodes that intends to deal with malicious banks.
Before considering the requirements of start nodes, we define the way we compute the balance
of each account according to a given blockgraph. Recall that the blockgraph contains an init node
that encodes the initial balance, and transactions that appear in start nodes. When computing
the total balance, we consider only accepted transactions, i.e., transactions that appear in start
nodes that have matching accept nodes. We compute the total balance by starting with the initial
balance, and then applying the accepted transactions. Note however that the same transaction
might appear in more than one start node (in start nodes of different banks), so we must make sure
that we apply it only once. Moreover, there might be different transactions of the same user with
the same sequence number that appear in different start nodes of different banks. Such transactions
are conflicting, and we don’t want to apply them together. Recall that the set of nodes between a
start node and a matching accept node (including the start node and the accept node themselves)
are considered a single block. We say that one block, b1, acknowledges another block, b2, if the
accept node of b1 acknowledges the start node of b2 (i.e., the subgraph of the accept node of b1
contains the start node of b2). For example, in Figure 1, the bottom block of B2 and the block
of B1 both acknowledge each other (note the update node that appears below that block of B2).
On the contrary, the block of B3 acknowledges that bottom block of B2, but not vice versa.
Assume that there is a pair of conflicting transactions that appear in two blocks b1 and b2.
If b1 acknowledges b2, then we don’t apply the conflicting transaction from b1 as it “knows”, at
the moment of accepting its transactions, that there is already another conflicting transaction. If
both b1 and b2 acknowledge each other, then both transactions won’t be applied. The problem is
if no block acknowledges the other, as both conflicting transactions will be applied. We shall soon
consider that case, but we first conclude the total balance computation:
Definition 2 (Total balance). Given a blockgraph, we take the initial balance according to the
init node, and then for every accept node we apply every transaction that appears in its matching
start node, as long as the accept node’s subgraph doesn’t contain a conflicting transaction, and as
long as the same transaction wasn’t already applied earlier in the computation.
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We can now define the validity requirements for start nodes. Let v be a start node that belongs
to bank B and whose subgraph, G, is valid. v will be valid if all the transactions that it contains
are valid. Let t be a transaction that appears in v, that belongs to the user u and transfers amount
of m to another account. Roughly speaking, t is considered valid if it is indeed the next transaction
in the transaction-chain of u, and if u has a balance of at least m. We start with deciding if t is
indeed the next transaction in u’s chain. First, we consider all the accepted transactions of u in G
(ignoring identical transactions). Assuming there are N such transactions, their sequence numbers
must cover all the range of 1 to N , or else t will be considered invalid, as that user has no valid
transaction chain. The sequence number of t must be N + 1 in this case, and there must be no
other, different, transaction of u with the sequence number of N + 1 that appears in G. There
might be however another transaction that is identical to t, as long that it appears in a start node
of another bank, B′ (where B′ 6= B). In this case this means that u has resubmitted t to B, maybe
because B′ stopped responding. Note that there cannot be a matching accept node for that start
node of B′ (in G), because then this identical transaction would either be accepted, and then t is
not valid because it should have a bigger sequence number, or otherwise it would be rejected, which
means that there is another, different, transaction with the same sequence number (N + 1), so t is,
once again, invalid. The second requirement for t’s validity is that u has a balance of at least m.
We decide the balance of u by computing the total balance according to G (the subgraph of the
start node v). If t fulfills both requirements it is considered valid.
Next, we need to define the validity requirements of an accept node. Let va be an accept node
that belongs to bank B, and let vs be the start node that comes before va in B’s chain. The creation
of va signals that the transactions of vs should be accepted. B can create va only once that vs is in
consensus. Consensus in our system is defined by coin possession. Each user has a voting power that
is proportional to his balance, and that voting power is delegated to the user’s bank. va is considered
valid if it is evident from its subgraph that there is a set of banks, S, that together hold voting
power above a predefined threshold, and that they all acknowledged vs. More precisely, a bank B
′
is in S if (and only if) it has a node v such that (1) va acknowledged v and (2) v acknowledged vs.
Recall that a node v1 acknowledges another node, v2, if v2 appears in v1’s subgraph. Recall also
that the sequence of nodes of B starting from vs and ending at va are considered a single block (see
Fig. 1). If B′ ∈ S we say that B′ supports va’s block. To finish the definition of validity requirements
of an accept node, we need to define how to compute the voting power of each bank and to define
the threshold of required supporting voting power. We shall soon do so.
When computing the total balance, we mentioned above that there is a problem if two blocks
that contain conflicting transactions don’t know of each other. In such case, the two conflicting
transactions will be both applied when computing the total balance, and that might result in
an account that has a negative balance. Such account has managed to spend more than what it
originally had, and unlike in real life, no one can come to that account owner and ask the money
back. To avoid this problem, we want to make sure that all the blocks know each other. This brings
us to the following definition.
Definition 3 (Proper graph). We say that a blockgraph is proper if for every pair of accept
nodes, at least one of them acknowledges the start node of the other.
We shall prove later that computing the total balance of a blockgraph that is proper and valid
results in non-negative balance for all the accounts. Thus, we have big interest in proper graphs.
How can we make sure that a (valid) blockgraph will remain proper? I.e., that for every two accept
nodes, at least one of them acknowledges the start node of the other? Roughly speaking, we can
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get this effect by making sure that every block (/accept node) is supported by the voting power of
majority of the banks. In this case, every two different blocks (/accept nodes) will be obliged to share
some common supporting voting power. I.e., there must be at least one bank that supports both
blocks. Let B be such bank, that supports two blocks, b1 and b2, and assume it first acknowledges b1
and then acknowledges b2. When b2 acknowledges B’s acknowledgment on b2 itself, it acknowledges
also the acknowledgment of B on b1, and so it indirectly acknowledges b1. As a result, the two
blocks are indeed connected.
We shall now define how to compute the voting power distribution. Every blockgraph defines
a specific voting power distribution between the banks. In its most basic form, the voting power
of a bank is the amount of money belong to the users of this bank. Thus, to compute the voting
power distribution, we start by computing the total balance according to the graph. Recall that
computing the total balance considers only accepted blocks (i.e., completed blocks – start nodes
that are followed by matching accept nodes). This is not enough, however. We might have a problem
with “open blocks” – start nodes that don’t have a matching accept node. If a transaction in such
an open block transfers money from one bank to another (or, more precisely, between users of
these banks), then the transferred money is “in transit” between the two banks. We name the bank
from which money is transferred as the “source bank”, and the bank that receives the money as
the “destination bank”. The true concern is when such a transaction appears in a start node of a
bank which is not the source bank. In such case, some banks might see extensions of this graph,
where that open block is already closed, and the money no longer belongs to the source bank, but
to the destination bank. Yet, the source bank might not be aware of this “closure”, and it might
keep using that money as part of its own voting power. The result is that the same money(/voting
power) might be used to support different blocks, that might not be aware of each other, and this
might result in a non proper graph. To avoid this problem, we define such money to be shared
between the two banks (the source and destination banks). A shared money can support a block
only if all the banks that share it support that block.
An exception is the case where such a problematic transaction, that appears in an “open” block,
is doomed to be rejected because there is already another (or identical) transaction of the same user
with the same sequence number that is accepted according to this graph. On the contrary, there
might be several conflicting problematic transactions, in different open blocks. In this case, the
money will be shared between the source bank and all possible destination banks. More formally
we define the following set of problematic transactions:
Definition 4 (Uncertain transactions set). Let G be a blockgraph. We define the set of uncer-
tain transactions in G as follows. We start with the set of transactions that appear in start nodes
that don’t have matching accept nodes in G. Let t be a transaction from this set, that appears in
an “open” start node that belongs to bank A and that transfers money from an account in bank B
to an account in bank C. The set of uncertain transactions includes t exactly if: (1) A 6= B 6= C
(possibly A = C), and (2) there is no other transaction of the same user with the same sequence
number as t that is applied when computing the total balance according to G.
The money that is transferred by uncertain transactions is exactly the money that we cannot
be sure to which bank its corresponding voting power should be delegated – the source bank
or the destination bank. Thus, we will define that money (or, more precisely, the corresponding
voting power) as shared between the two banks. As we shall now prove, if a user has several
uncertain transactions, then they all have the same sequence number. If our graph is proper (and
remains proper), this means that at most one of these transactions might be later accepted, and
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so that money will belong either to only one of the destination banks (if one of the transactions
gets accepted) or to the source bank (in case all the transactions get rejected). Thus, we define
that money as shared between the source bank and the destination banks of all those conflicting
transactions (as exactly one of them might get that money). Note that those conflicting transactions
might wish to transfer different amounts of money, so we simply take the biggest amount among
those amounts of money.6 We shall now prove what we claimed above:
Lemma 2. Let G be a blockgraph whose start nodes are all valid, and let t1 and t2 be two trans-
actions that appear in G. If t1 and t2 are uncertain transactions of the same user, then both have
the same sequence number.
Proof. Let t1 and t2 be two uncertain transactions in G that belong to the same user, u. Assume by
way of contradiction that they have different sequence numbers. Without loss of generality, assume
that t1 has a lower sequence number. By the assumptions, the start node where t2 appears must be
valid. According to the validity requirements of a start node, there are in its subgraph (thus, in G)
accepted transactions of u with all the sequence numbers between 1 and one below the sequence
number of t2. Thus, there is an accepted transaction of u with the same sequence number as t1, and
so t1 cannot be an uncertain transaction (according to the uncertain transactions definition).
We now formally define the voting power distribution:
Definition 5 (Voting power distribution). Let G be a blockgraph. We define the voting power
distribution of G as follows. We start by computing the total balance, according to G. The initial
voting power of each bank is the sum of money of its users.
Next, we consider the uncertain transactions in G, and divide them according to their issuing
user. For each user we take the transaction that wishes to transfer the biggest sum of money. That
sum of money is decreased from the voting power of his bank, and is granted to a coalition that
consists of his bank and the banks of all the users that might get money according to that user’s set
of uncertain transactions.
We can now finish defining the requirements for an accept node, va, to be valid. Recall that
we defined S to be the set of banks that support va (where a bank B
′ supports va exactly if va
acknowledges a node of B′ that acknowledges vs – the start node that comes before va). The sum of
voting power of banks from S, including voting power that is shared exclusively by members of S,
must be above a predefined threshold that we shall soon consider. As we shall see, this threshold
depends on what we assume about the banks nature.
After defining the validity requirements of nodes, we say that a blockgraph is valid if all of its
nodes are valid. We wish that a valid blockgraph will be also proper. If the banks are not malicious,
then the voting power threshold required for an accept node to be valid can be defined as a simple
majority (i.e., half the total voting power), and then we can prove that every valid graph is also
proper. However, an assumption that there are no malicious banks is not practical. We now extend
our definitions in order to deal with malicious banks, and formally prove that valid blockgraphs
6 A more accurate way to define the shared voting power is as follows. First, find the transaction that wishes to
transfer the lowest amount of money, and define its money has shared between all the banks from the uncertain
transactions set of the user. Then, find the transaction with the next lowest amount of money, and define the
difference between the two transactions as shared between all the banks from the set above, removing the previous
transaction. Keep doing so until no transactions left. When using this method, each bank will have a “shared”
part that is equal to the amount that it can actual get, and no more than it.
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will be proper. A bank is considered malicious if it creates conflicting nodes – different nodes
with the same sequence number. The problem with such conflicting nodes is that they might seem
valid for themselves (when observing their subgraphs), and different banks might adopt a different
node of the conflicting pair. Only when the valid banks find out that there are two conflicting
nodes, they know that the bank that created them is malicious. More precisely, if a blockgraph
contains conflicting nodes of a given bank, then this bank is considered malicious according to this
blockgraph. I.e., the blockgraph itself holds the proof that the bank is malicious.
We deal with malicious banks by defining update nodes to be invalid if it is evident from their
subgraph that their own bank is malicious. I.e., a malicious bank cannot reference nodes of banks
that already know that it is malicious, as it will make its update nodes invalid and the other banks
won’t accept such invalid nodes. Another optional, cosmetic, requirement (which has no practical
importance) is that update nodes (of valid banks) won’t reference nodes of banks that are already
known to be malicious. More precisely, if it is evident from the subgraph of the parent of an update
node (the node that comes before that update node in its bank’s chain) that a specific bank is
malicious, then this update node should not directly reference a new node of that bank.
Recall that we want graphs to be proper, so that conflicting transactions won’t be accepted
together. With malicious banks around, we must make sure they don’t turn our graphs to non
proper. The “easiest” way for a malicious bank to turn a graph to be non proper is by issuing two
conflicting start nodes, each accompanied with an accept node of its own. However, a bank cannot
create a (valid) accept node at its will, as it needs the support of the majority of the voting power
(above the predefined threshold). We claim that the voting power of a non malicious bank can
support at most one of such conflicting accept nodes (will be proved later on). Thus, by defining
the threshold of the required voting power to be high enough, and by assuming that the voting
power in the hands of malicious banks is limited, we prevent malicious banks the option of creating
such two conflicting accept nodes (that are based on different start nodes).
But, what prevents a malicious bank from creating two conflicting accept nodes for a single
start node? I.e., after gathering the required support for a valid, single, start node, a malicious
bank might create two conflicting, and valid, accept nodes. Assume that the malicious bank B¯
indeed creates such two conflicting accept nodes v1 and v2 for a single start node v. Moreover,
assume that there is a transaction t that appears in v that is accepted at v1 but rejected at v2
(because there is an update node that comes before v2, but not before v1, that references another
block that contains a transaction that is conflicting with t). The result is that some of the banks
might see v1, so they shall think that t should be applied, while other might see v2 and think
that t should be rejected. The problem in the above case is not the temporary situation where
some banks accept an extra transaction (t) while others don’t, as the latter banks shall sooner or
later see also v1, that accepts t, and then they should apply it as well. Instead, the true problem
is that this state can lead to creation of a valid graph that is not proper. The reason is that v1
and v2 induce different voting power distributions. Considering the voting power that corresponds
to the amount of money that is transferred by t, that voting power belongs to the destination bank,
according to v1, and to the original bank according to v2. Thus, each of the banks might think that
this voting power is in its own hands, and each of them might use it to support a different block. As
a result, two different blocks might enjoy the support of the same voting power without knowing
of each other, which might produce a non proper graph.
In order to solve this problem we separate the actual acceptance/rejection of a transaction (at
an accept node) from the decision of whether it would be accepted or rejected. We introduce a
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new node to the blockgraph – a close node, that must appear exactly once between every pair of
start node and accept node. The validity requirement of a close node is exactly as the requirement
of an accept node, i.e., it must have a supporting voting power above a predefined threshold. More
precisely, let vs be a start node, and let vc and va be the close and accept nodes respectively that
come after vs. We define two set of banks, Sc and Sa. A bank B
′ is in Sc if and only if it has a
node v such that (1) vc has acknowledged v and (2) v has acknowledged vs. A bank B
′′ is in Sa if
and only if it has a node v′ such that (1) va has acknowledged v′ and (2) v′ has acknowledged vc. vc
will be valid if the sum of voting power of the banks in Sc, computed according to vc’s subgraph, is
above a predefined threshold, and va will be valid under the same condition when considering the
set of Sa, and the voting power distribution according to va’s subgraph.
Using the close node, a malicious bank might still create two conflicting accept nodes, but both
of them will be based on the same close node (just as before that, two conflicting accept nodes had
to be based on the same start node, or otherwise they wouldn’t get the required supporting voting
power). Next, we change the definition of the total balance computation, such that a transaction
is considered conflicting (and get rejected) only if it is evident from the corresponding close node
(instead of the accept node):
Definition 6 (Total balance #2). Given a blockgraph, we take the initial balance according
to the init node, and then for every accept node we apply every transaction that appears in its
matching start node, as long that the subgraph of its matching close node doesn’t contain a conflicting
transaction, and as long that the same transaction wasn’t already applied before that.
Now, two conflicting accept nodes that are based on a single close node have no effect. The
same transactions will be accepted or rejected in both. Note that a malicious bank might also create
conflicting close nodes (based on a single start node), but as long that it will be able to complete
only one of them with a matching accept node, there will be no effect. This motivates updating the
definition of proper graph:
Definition 7 (Proper graph #2). We say that a blockgraph is proper if (1) for every pair of
close nodes, at least one of them acknowledges the start node of the other, and (2) for every pair
of accept nodes, at least one of them acknowledges the close node of the other.
The first requirement, concerning close nodes, is equal to the original requirement from proper
graph, that makes sure that there is a connection between every two blocks, so that conflicting
transactions won’t be applied together. The second requirement, concerning accept nodes, comes to
deal with malicious banks. I.e., it makes sure that malicious banks don’t creates distinct accept nodes
to distinct (conflicting) close nodes. We can now have the following claim (proved in Appendix B):
Lemma 3. Computing the total balance of a blockgraph that is valid and proper results in non-
negative balance for all the accounts.
We want graphs to always be proper, where conflicting transactions cannot be accepted together
and where balances are kept non negative. As we shall now claim, valid graphs will be proper indeed,
assuming the voting power of malicious banks is limited. In classical distributed systems theory we
assume a fixed set of servers or nodes. Dealing with malicious (more commonly called byzantine)
nodes often involves an assumption that more than two thirds of the nodes are non-malicious (or,
non byzantine). This is similar in our case, only that there is no importance here to the number
of the nodes (i.e., banks), but rather to the voting power distribution. Voting power is considered
“valid” if it belongs to a non-malicious bank, or shared by only non-malicious banks. The voting
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power distribution should always be such that more than two thirds of the total voting power is
valid. Following that assumption, we define the threshold of required voting power for creation of
valid accept and close nodes to be at least two thirds of the total voting power.
We are now ready for the main claim of this subsection (proved in Appendix C):
Lemma 4 (Proper graphs). Let G be a valid and proper blockgraph. If more than two thirds of
the voting power in every subgraph of G is in the hands of banks that are not malicious according
to G, then extending G by a single valid node will result in valid and proper graph.
4.2 The protocol
In the previous subsection we described the blockgraph that we use as a ledger. We now define the
protocol P that the banks should follow. Every bank that takes part in the system must start with
a blockgraph that contains only the init node that matches I. As time passes, each bank might
add to its blockgraph new nodes that it creates or receives from other banks. The protocol we use
is rather straightforward:
– When receiving a transaction from a user, check if it may be rejected, according to the rejection
restriction requirement (see Section 3). If it may be rejected, reject it. Otherwise, add it to a
list of waiting user transactions.
– If you can create a start node (your previous start node has a matching accept node) and your
list of waiting transactions is not empty, then extract the transactions from the list, keep the
ones that are still valid according to your current graph (i.e., that cannot be rejected according
to the rejection restriction), and create a new start node from those transactions (as long that
at least one of the transactions was valid indeed). Reject the transactions that aren’t valid
anymore.
– If you have an open transactions block (a start node with no matching close node, or a close
node with no matching accept node) and you can validly create an accept/close node, then
create it. When creating a close node, Reject transactions that appear in the current start node
that have conflicting transactions according to the current close node’s subgraph.
– When receiving a node from another bank, check if it is already included in your blockgraph. If
not, then check if the nodes it references are included in your blockgraph. If not, ask the other
banks for these nodes. If (or once) your blockgraph includes all the nodes that are referenced by
the node you received (but doesn’t include that node itself), then make sure that (1) the node is
valid, and (2) that adding it to your graph won’t make your graph improper. If it satisfies both
criteria, then add the node to your blockgraph, and create a new update node that references
it.7
– After creating a node in one of the above cases, send this node to all other banks.
– After adding an accept node to the graph, Accept the transactions that should be applied
according to the graph.
We want to prove that executions of our system fulfill the requirements we defined in Section 3
(Agreement, Positive Balance, Termination and Rejection Restriction). We start with the
rejection restriction requirement. According to the protocol, the transaction t that is submitted to
7 In a practical implementation we don’t have to respond with an update node if this won’t deliver any impor-
tant information for the protocol. E.g., there is no importance to acknowledge an acknowledgment to a previous
acknowledgment of your own node.
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a valid bank B will be rejected if (1) B is allowed to reject it according to the rejection restriction
requirement, or (2) if it appears in a start node of B, and according to its matching close node
there is another conflicting transaction (a different transaction of the same account with the same
sequence number). In both cases the rejection restriction is not violated.
The positive balance requirement holds by Lemma 3 because the graph of every valid bank is
always proper (as we don’t accept nodes that cause it to be improper).
Agreement holds if every accept node that is accepted by one valid bank, will be accepted by
all the other valid banks. Such accept node must be valid, or else it wouldn’t have been accepted
by the first valid bank. Thus, it won’t be accepted by another bank only if it will make its graph
improper. If the voting power distribution according to every valid bank’s blockgraph, at every
time point, is such that more than two thirds of the voting power is valid (i.e., in the hands of valid
banks), then adding a new, single, valid node won’t make any of these graphs improper, following
Lemma 4.
After agreement we left only with the termination requirement. While practically termination
should pose no concern, it is theoretically problematic. We call it the problem of migrating power,
and it generally applies to every cryptocurrency system where the possible number of admins is
unbounded and where some resource is used as the base for decisions. The problem with resources
is that they might migrate. One day they are in one hand, the second they are in another. If the
lazy user sends his transaction to an admin that already lost its power, then that admin will have to
forward it to the one that is now in power (that holds a big share of resources). But, what if by the
time this transaction reaches the second admin, the power has already migrated to another admin?
More generally, if the time it takes the power to migrate is smaller than the delay of messages
from those admins that have already lost the power (not very reasonable), then a user that sent
his transaction to an “old” admin will never get a response.
In practice this problem doesn’t seem to make sense, and anyway a user that sees that his
transaction doesn’t get to the right locations can resubmit his transaction to the current power
owners. Power migration is problematic only if the power migrates infinitely, going through infinite
number of admins. Now, let’s be realistic, our coin won’t live forever. In that finite time that it
does, there is a finite set of banks that will ever had any voting power, and in particular a finite
set of valid banks. Thus, if we assumed before that two thirds of the voting power is always in
the hands of valid banks, then we can further assume that there is a finite set of valid banks that
together always hold more than two thirds of the voting power. Following this assumption, we shall
prove that termination holds.
We start with the following claim: Let B be a valid bank, that created a start node, but didn’t
create yet a matching close node. We claim that eventually B will create the matching close node.
The same claim (with the same proof) is that if B created a close node with no matching accept
node, then eventually it will create that matching accept node.
Proof: According to the protocol, B will create the close node at the moment that it can. It can
create such node only if the sum of voting power that supports the matching start node is at least
two thirds of the total voting power. When B created the start node, it sent it to all other banks.
Now, recall that by the assumption there is a finite set of banks that more than two thirds of the
voting power is always in their hands. We denote this set by S. The banks in S will eventually
accept that start node of B (once they accepted the nodes that it references), as it is valid, and it
won’t make their graph improper (as we have seen before). After they accept it, they will create
corresponding update nodes, that reference this start node, and they will send their update nodes
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back to B. In return, B will create new update nodes that reference the update nodes it received
from the banks of S. At this point B has the support of all the banks from S. Considering the
voting power distribution, more than two thirds of the voting power is in their hands, so B has the
required supporting voting power, and it will create a close node.
Now we can easily prove that the termination requirement holds. Proof: Let B be a valid bank
that receives a transaction from its user. According to the protocol, B will put the transaction in its
next start node, or otherwise it will reject it (if it is non valid). The only thing that might prevent B
from creating its next start node is if it already has an open start node without a matching close
node or accept node. According to the above claim, B will eventually create matching close node
and accept node, and then it will also create a new start node that will contain the required
transaction. Once again, according to the above claim, B will eventually create matching close
node and accept node to the new start node as well. Once it created the accept node, it also either
accepts or rejects the transaction.
To summarize, we proved above the following claim:
Lemma 5. Let B be the set of possible public keys of banks, let r be an execution of our system and
let B′ ⊆ B be the subset of valid banks in r. If there is a finite set B′′ ⊆ B′ such that at every time
point the voting power distribution according to the blockgraph of every B ∈ B′ is such that more
than 2/3 of the voting power is in the hands of banks from B′′, then r satisfies the requirements
defined in Section 3.
4.3 Implications
The protocol and settings defined above are rather limited, and intended to provide only the
minimum that is required in order to have a cryptocurrency that achieves the requirements we
defined under asynchronous communications. We provide here some details and implications we
ignored.
The first case concerns allegedly malicious users. According to the blockgraph definition, a user
that submitted conflicting transactions might not be able to submit any additional transaction,
which makes its money unusable. This can be seen as a punishment to such user, but it might be a
too harsh punishment, as it might be an honest mistake, with no malicious intentions. To overcome
it, we can allow a user to submit a “group of transactions” with a single sequence number. Such
group won’t be considered as conflicting with any subset of the transactions it contains.
Another concept that wasn’t discussed above is the commission. We have mentioned in the
introduction that a user will pay commission for each of his issued transactions. The simplest
approach is that the commission will be a fixed percentage of the transaction sum, that is given
to the bank of the user that issued the transaction. Another option is to divide the commission
between the user’s bank (probably about an half of the commission) and the banks that supported
the block at which that transaction appeared (as they all took part in the agreement process). If we
want to encourage participation of as many banks as possible, then we can define the commission
percentage to be variable, where this percentage gets bigger as more banks (voting power) support
the block. As the issuing bank receives a fixed share of the commission, the commission it receives
will be bigger as more banks support its block. This incentivizes the issuing bank to ask for the
acceptance of as many banks as it can.
However, sharing the commission between the banks that supported the block might cause
problems if the same transaction appears in blocks of different banks, as it is not clear then according
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to which block we divide the commission. Such case is possible if the user submitted a transaction
to his bank and got no response, so he sent it also to another bank, and as a result both banks
might create blocks that contain this transaction. In order to solve this problem we can define that
the commission distribution is computed only according the block of the original bank of the user.
If that bank stops responding before it manages to accept its block, then the amount of commission
that should have been taken remains effectively as inaccessible money.
5 Conclusions
Cryptocurrency systems should allow users to easily transfer money between them, without excess
bureaucracy and supervision. The complexity of creating such systems is in managing the required
consensus, regarding the accepted transactions, in a permissionless settings where every one can
take part in the consensus process. In Section 3 we defined requirements that should form a cryp-
tocurrency system that is “fair” to its users: A user that creates valid sequence of transactions
can be sure that its transactions will be accepted. Moreover, the transactions, once accepted, will
remain accepted, so the recipient can be sure that he got the money. This requirement doesn’t
apply with blockchain, where a sequence of blocks might be accepted as part of the blockchain, and
later be ignored, in favor of another, parallel, longer sequence. On the other hand, the requirements
we define are flexible enough so that we can implement a system that satisfies the requirements
under completely asynchronous networks. This is achieved by allowing the rejection of conflicting
transactions without forcing acceptance of one of them.
As a solution for the problem described in Section 3, we introduce a system that has beneficial
characteristics of its own. The system bases the consensus on the coin possession, so we avoid the
great waste of energy that exists in proof of work coins. Moreover, the latency in the system is only
due to message transmission times and the time it takes to perform the basic required computations
of validating/applying signatures.
Security in our case is very plain and simple. By employing a deterministic protocol, that works
even when communication is asynchronous, the only way to undermine the security is if more than
one third of the voting power will be in malicious hands, or, more precisely, in your hands (it doesn’t
help if the other malicious banks don’t cooperate with you).
5.1 Future Work
There are yet many open challenges for implementing the system presented in this paper, and
further research is required. For example, we might want to spare memory, and not to remember
the entire blockgraph. The question is what can we forget, and under what conditions. Another
challenge is with large number of banks. The more banks we have, the bigger the requirement
for memory and bandwidth. At some point, if there will be banks that won’t have strong enough
hardware, and their voting power on the other hand will be significant (so they are required for the
consensus process to complete), it might cause extra delay in the system.
An existing downside in many cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin and the coin presented in this
paper is that the system is completely transparent. I.e., every transaction that is accepted is visible
to the public, so that everyone can see the source and destination accounts, and the sum of money
that was transferred. Yet, the identities of the account owners are of course generally unknown. An
interesting direction in our case is if we can limit the transparency to the level of banks, so that the
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only entities that truly know the transaction source, destination and sum of money (all together)
are the banks of the issuing and receiving clients.
An important concept in cryptocurrencies at which consensus is based on coin possession,
such as in Proof of Stake, is that malicious entities will be financially damaged because of their
acts. Otherwise, different entities (and especially strong entities, that posses a lot of coin) might
maliciously attempt to maneuver the currency, without getting harmed. This is the famous nothing
at stake problem. Note that this is never true in practice, because an unstable coin will have a lower
value, so such entities that posses a lot of coin have an interest in keeping the coin credible. Yet,
if the coin value is decreased, this will harm also non malicious parties. Thus, the best practice is
indeed financially damaging those malicious entities.
Note that in our case banks should have a private account, to where they receive the commission
on the users’ accepted transactions. A best practice will be to define that transactions that wish to
transfer private money of a bank will be allowed to appear only in start nodes of that banks itself.
Recall that a malicious bank (that made a malicious act) won’t mange to create new blocks, as it
cannot reference nodes of other banks that are already aware to its malice so it cannot gain the
required support for a block. Thus, a malicious bank won’t be able to use its private money (and
once it turned out to be malicious, it won’t receive any more commission). If we can incentivize a
bank to keep money in its private account, this can be used as means to make sure the bank follows
the protocol, as if it won’t, then it will lose that money. This will be similar to real banks, that
by regulatory requirements, in order to ensure their stability, must have some capital of their own
(such stability is not relevant to our banks, as they cannot use their clients’ money, as opposed to
real world banks).
The most reasonable way to incentivize the banks to keep private money is by limiting their
voting power in case they don’t have enough private money. I.e., we can define a percentage of
private money out of the voting power of a bank that the bank must have in order to use its
full voting power. If it doesn’t have the required percentage, its voting power will be decreased
proportionally. A more research is required in order to make sure that the system still complies
with the agreement and termination requirements.
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A Execution
Let (A, I,B, P ) be a cryptocurrency system. An execution of the system is defined by the tuple
(X,Users,Admins, F, Tx,Msgs,Ac,Re). X is a (possibly infinite) set of nodes that act as users
and admins. Users is a map X → 2A that assigns each node a set of account numbers, and Admins
is a map X → 2B that assigns each node a set of admin IDs. For every x1, x2 ∈ X, if x1 6= x2 then
Admins(x1) and Admins(x2) are disjoint sets. If a ∈ Users(x1), then we say that x1 represents
the account number a. The same goes with admins. A node that represents an account number
is considered a user. A node that represents an admin is considered an admin. Note that a node
can be both a user and an admin. The nodes communicate by message passing. We assume a fully
connected network. Users can create transactions and send them to the admins. The admins can
send messages between them and accept/reject user transactions. Admins should send messages
and accept/reject transactions only if they should do so by the protocol. Admins that don’t do so
are considered malicious. Malicious admins can perform arbitrary operations, but they cannot send
messages that contain data that was digitally signed by someone else, unless they received that
signed data beforehand. The same goes with accepting/rejecting transactions.
F is a map X → {R≥0 ∪∞} that defines for every x ∈ X the time when x fails by crashing.8
If the time value is “∞”, the node never crashes. A node that crashed cannot create transactions,
send/receive messages or accept/reject transaction after it crashed. An admin is considered valid if
it is not malicious and if its representing node doesn’t crash.
Tx = {(tx, b, t)} is the set of transactions that were submitted by the users, where tx is a
transaction (as defined in Section 3), b ∈ B is the admin to whom the transaction was submitted,
and t ∈ {R+ ∪ ⊥} is the time that the node that represents b received tx, where ⊥ means that it
never receives it. t can be ⊥ only if either the node that represents b or some node that represents
8 A more practical definition should include for every node the time when it becomes active. We avoided doing so
for ease of exposition.
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the source account of tx crashes. If t 6= ⊥, then both the node that represents b and some node
that represents a must not crash before t.
Msgs = {(bs, bt,m, tSend, tReceive)} is the set of messages that are sent between admins (or,
more precisely, between nodes that represent admins). bs, bt ∈ B are the source and destination ad-
mins respectively, both must be represented by some nodes. m is the message contents, tSend ∈ R+
is the time the message was sent, and tReceive ∈ {R+ ∪ ⊥} is the time the message was received.
Assume that xs, xt ∈ X are the nodes that represent bs and bt respectively. If xs crashes at time t′,
then tSend < t′. If tReceive = ⊥ this means that the message was never received, which is possible
only if xs or xt crashes. Otherwise, tReceive > tSend and if xt crashes at time t
′ then t′ > tReceive.
Ac = {(b, tx, t)} is the set of accepted transactions, where b ∈ B is the admin, tx is a transaction
that was submitted by a client and t ∈ R+ is the time that b accepted tx. Re is a similar set that
describes the rejected transactions.
Using the above definition, we can examine if a given execution satisfies the requirements defined
in Section 3.
B Proof of Lemma 3
Before proving Lemma 3, we start with a technical auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 6. Let G be a a valid and proper blockgraph. We can construct a sequence of graphs with
the following properties:
– The first graph in the sequence contains only a single node - the init node of G.
– Each graph extends the previous graph in the sequence by exactly one node.
– The last graph is equal to G.
– All the graphs in the sequence are valid and proper blockgraphs.
Proof. Recall that blockgraphs contain no cycles. Thus, we can define a topological ordering on
the nodes of G. For every node of G, all the nodes in its subgraph come after it in the topological
order. We construct the sequence of graphs such that the n’th graph contains the n last nodes in
the topological order and the edges that connect them. This sequence clearly answers the first three
requirements.
Every graph in this sequence is indeed a blockgraph according to Lemma 1. It is also valid,
because if one of its nodes is invalid, then it will be invalid also in G. Assume by way of contradiction
that one of these graphs, G′, is not proper. That means that there are in G′ a pair of accept nodes
that don’t know the close nodes of each other, or a pair of close nodes that don’t know the start
nodes of each other. The same pair also appear in G, and have the same subgraphs in G and G′.
Thus, they also don’t know the close or start node of each other in G and so G is not proper, in
contradiction with the assumption that it is.
We shall now prove the main lemma:
Proof. Let G be a valid and proper blockgraph. We construct the sequence of graphs according to
the above lemma. Note that every graph in this sequence is valid and proper. We shall prove by
induction that the current lemma applies for each of these graphs, and so it applies also to G (the
last graph in the sequence). The first graph contains only the init node of G. In an init node all
the sums of money are positive, so the lemma clearly holds for the first graph.
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Assume that the lemma is true for the n’th graph in the list, G1. We prove it is also true for
the (n + 1)’th graph, G2. Note that G2 extends G1 by only a single node. If this node is a start
node, close node or update node, then there is no difference in the balance computation between G1
and G2 so the lemma holds for G2 as well.
If this node is an accept node, then we can compute the total balance according to G2 by starting
from the balance of G1, and then apply the transactions that should be accepted according to the
new accept node. We denote the new accept node by va and its matching start node by vs. Let t be
a transaction that appears in vs, accepted in va, and was not applied in the balance computation
of G1. Note that t is one of those transactions that will be applied after we already computed the
balance according to G1. Let u be the user (the account) that transfers money according to t. As vs
is valid, the balance that u has according to the subgraph of vs is no less than the money that
should be transferred in t. We denote vs’s subgraph by Gs. u can “lose” money between Gs and G1
only if it has accepted transactions in G1 that aren’t accepted yet in Gs. However, we claim that all
the accepted transactions of u in G1 are already accepted in Gs. Thus, the balance of u according
to G1 is no smaller than the balance of u according to Gs, and after applying t in G2 the balance
of u remains non negative, as claimed.
We still need to prove that indeed all the accepted transactions of u in G1 are already accepted
in Gs. As vs is valid, we can see in its subgraph (Gs) accepted transactions of u, with all the sequence
numbers up to one less than the sequence number of t (each transaction with a different sequence
number). Assume by way of contradiction that there is an accepted transaction of u in G1 that
doesn’t appear in Gs. If that transaction has a sequence number smaller than the sequence number
of t, then it is conflicting with another transaction, which is impossible as G1 is proper. It cannot
have an equal sequence number to t, as it cannot be conflicting with t, from the same reason as
above (because G2 is proper), and it cannot be identical to t, because t is first accepted in va (recall
that t wasn’t applied in the balance computation of G1). If it has a bigger sequence number, then
the start node at which that transaction appears must have in its subgraph an accepted transaction
with the sequence number as t, which we have just proved to be impossible.
C Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Let G be a valid and proper graph, that satisfies the condition of the lemma. I.e., more
than two thirds of the voting power in every subgraph of G is in the hands of banks that are not
malicious according to G. Let v be a valid node that doesn’t appear in G, but whose subgraph is
also a subgraph of G (so we can extend G by v). Let Gv be G extended by v.
Gv is non-proper if it contains a pair of either (1) accept nodes that don’t know the close node
of each other, or (2) close nodes that don’t know the start node of each other. We call a pair of
such accept nodes or close nodes an ignorant pair. As G is proper, it contains no ignorant pairs.
The only way that Gv will be non-proper is if v forms an ignorant pair with one or more nodes
from G. This is possible only if v is a close node or an accept node. We start by assuming that v
is an accept node. The proof for v that is a close node is identical.
Assume by way of contradiction that Gv is non-proper. Thus, it contains one or more ignorant
pairs (where each pair includes v and another node from G). We want to find a subgraph of Gv
that contains exactly one ignorant pair of nodes. We will prove that it is impossible for the two
nodes of this pair to gather the required supporting voting power, so one of them must be invalid,
which means that either v or G are invalid, contradicting the assumption that they are both valid.
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Considering Gv, if there is only one pair of ignorant nodes, then we can keep on with the proof.
Assume otherwise that there is more than one such a pair. We can obtain subgraphs of Gv by
removing nodes from Gv. However, if we remove a node we must also remove all the nodes whose
subgraphs contain the removed node, or otherwise we will remain with a subgraph that is not a
blockgraph. Note that by removing nodes, the set of ignorant pairs can only shrink (new ignorant
pairs cannot be created that way).
Let us consider two pairs of ignorant nodes. Recall that v appears in both pairs. Let v1 be
the second node of the first pair, and let v2 be the second node of the second pair. At least one
of v1 or v2 must not acknowledge the other, or otherwise there will be a cycle in the graph and
blockgraphs have no cycles. v don’t acknowledge any of v1 or v2, or otherwise those pairs weren’t
ignorant pairs. Thus, we can safely remove (at least) one of v1 and v2 (one of them that doesn’t
acknowledge the other) and remain with only one of the two ignorant pairs. We will keep doing
so repeatedly for every two ignorant pairs, and finally we shall remain only with a single pair, as
required.
Let G′ be the subgraph of Gv that we found, that contains only a single pair of ignorant nodes.
Let va and vb be the two nodes in this pair (note that one of them is v, but we shall use va and vb
for convenience). We want to prove that the sum of voting power that supports va and vb is less
than 4/3 of the total voting power, so they cannot both have the required voting power, and one
of them must be invalid.
We shall consider three different subgraphs of G′: (1) Ga, the subgraph of va, (2) Gb, the
subgraph of vb, and (3) Gab, the intersection of Ga and Gb. It can be easily seen (following Lemma 1)
that the three subgraphs are valid and proper blockgraphs (recall that the only ignorant pair in G′
contains va and vb, and they don’t appear in any of the above graphs). We compute the voting
power distribution according to each of these graphs. According to the assumptions, more than 2/3
of the voting power in each of these distributions belongs to non-malicious banks.
We claim that a non-malicious bank might either support va according to Ga, or support vb
according to Gb, but not both. Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that a non-malicious bank, B,
supports both nodes. This means that B has one or two update nodes whose subgraphs contain
the close nodes of va and vb (recall that we assumed, w.l.o.g, that va and vb are accept nodes). In
return, va and vb have these update nodes in their own subgraphs (Ga and Gb respectively). Let v1
and v2 be the (earliest) update nodes of B, such that the close node of va appears in the subgraph
of v1, and the close node of vb appears in the subgraph of v2. Without loss of generality, assume
that v1 appears before v2 in B’s chain, or that v1 = v2. This means that v1 appears in v2’s subgraph
(or that v1 = v2). As vb has v2 in its subgraph, that means that it also has v1 in its subgraph, and
so it also has the close node of va in its subgraph, contradicting the assumption that va and vb
form an ignorant pair.
Recall that a voting power is “valid” if it belongs to a non-malicious bank, or shared by group of
non-malicious banks, and “invalid” otherwise. Considering Gab’s voting power distribution, assume
that the sum of valid voting power is x, and the sum of non-valid voting power is y. Note that
x+ y is the total voting power in the system. For simplicity, we assume that x+ y = 1. According
to the assumption we have that y < 1/3. The valid voting power belongs to non-malicious banks.
As we have seen, a non-malicious bank might support at most one of va and vb. Invalid voting
power, however, might belong to banks that support both nodes. Thus, the sum of voting power
that supports va and vb according to the voting power distribution of Gab is at most x + 2y. Note
that x + 2y = (x + y) + y = 1 + y < 1 + 1/3 = 4/3, as required. We want to prove that this is
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also true when considering the correct supporting voting power – of va according to Ga, and of
vb according to Gb. For that cause we must consider the changes in the voting power distribution
when moving from Gab to Ga and Gb. We shall prove that the sum of valid voting power in Gab, x,
is still divided between the nodes, so the sum of x + 2y is still relevant (as an upper bound).
The major change in the voting power distribution will be due to new accept nodes, in Ga
and Gb, that will change the total balance distribution. Such new accept nodes can appear only for
matching start nodes that already appear in Gab. I.e., there cannot be a completely new block (from
start node to accept node) that appears in Ga or Gb. Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that
such a new block appears in Ga. This means that a new accept node, v
′, appears in the subgraph
of va together with a matching start node, and where that matching start node doesn’t appear in
the subgraph of vb (or else it would also appeared in Gab). There must be also a matching close
node that appears in the subgraph of va (as v
′ appears in it) but not in the subgraph of vb (or
else the matching start node would also appear there). Because the only ignorant pair in G′ are
va and vb, it follows that v
′ must know vb’s close node or else it will form another ignorant pair
together with vb, as vb doesn’t have the close node of v
′ in its own subgraph. As va knows v′, it
will also know vb’s close node, contradicting the original assumption that va and vb are ignorant
pairs. Thus, a new accept node can appear only if its start node already appears in Gab.
Except for new accept nodes (for existing start nodes), there might be also new start nodes
without matching accept nodes (but possibly with matching close nodes, in case va and vb are
indeed accept nodes9). The only effect that such new open blocks might have on the voting power
distribution is that existing amounts of voting power will be shared with additional banks because
of new uncertain transactions. Such sharing cannot increase the supporting voting power of va or vb,
because if that voting power didn’t support them in the first place, then sharing it with additional
bank won’t change it. However, if that voting power supported them beforehand, then now it might
not support them, in case the new bank doesn’t support them. Thus, such new start nodes might
only decrease the supporting voting power of the nodes. As we are interested in the maximal sum
of supporting power, we will ignore such new start nodes, and consider only the effect of new accept
nodes (for existing start nodes).
Recall that when computing the voting power distribution, we start with computing the balance
of each user. It can be seen as if each user has amount of voting power that equals to his balance,
and each user delegates his voting power to his bank. However, if the graph contains uncertain
transactions that belong to a specific user, then the bank of that user has to share some of this
voting power with other banks that might receive that power according to those transactions. To
conclude, we can divide the total voting power according to the amount that each user contributes
(the user’s balance), and further divide each such amount to shared and non-shared voting power.
We are interested in voting power that was valid in Gab. Such valid voting power is based on
balances of users that belong to non-malicious banks (the voting power of other users is delegated
to malicious banks, and so it is invalid). Even if the user belongs to a non-malicious bank, the
shared voting power that he contributes will be invalid in case one of the banks that share it is
malicious. We shall consider the valid voting power that each user (that sits in non-malicious bank)
contributes in Gab, and we shall see what happens with this voting power in Ga and Gb. Recall that
we defined x to be the sum of valid voting power in Gab. x is exactly the sum of all the contributions
of valid power from those users.
9 If va and vb are close nodes, then from the same reasoning as before, we will get that a new matching pair of start
node and close node cannot appear in Ga or Gb, or else va and vb wouldn’t be ignorant pair.
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Let u be a user of a non-malicious bank B. Concerning B, we have already proved that it might
either support (exactly) one of va or vb, or not support any of them. Assume that it supports va.
In this case it cannot have a new accept node that appears in Gb. Proof: Assume by way of
contradiction that a new accept node of B does appear in Gb. Denote that new accept node by v1.
That means that v1 appears in the subgraph of vb. It cannot appear also in Ga, as otherwise it
would appeared also in Gab, and then it won’t be “new”. As B supports va, according to Ga, then
one of its nodes in Ga has the matching close node of va in its subgraph. As this node appears
in Ga while v1 does not, then it must come before v1 in B’s chain (recall that B is non-malicious,
so it has no forks). Thus, v1 has the matching close node of va in its subgraph, and so does vb,
contradicting the assumption that va and vb are ignorant pair.
Recall that we are currently considering what happens with the valid voting power in Gab that
contributed a user u (in bank B). Assume, once again, that B supports va. This means that the
non-shared part of the voting power that u contributes supports va, and its shared voting power
either supports va or not, depending on the identities of the other banks. The voting power of u
cannot support vb, because we have already seen that B cannot support both va and vb. The
question is if the voting power that belonged to u in Gab might be later used to support vb in Gb.
This is possible only if a transaction of u is accepted in Gb (and not in Gab) such that some of
its money is transferred to another bank, that does support vb. Denote that transaction by t. We
proved above that a new accept node of B cannot appear in Gb. Thus, if t is accepted in Gb and
transfers money outside of B, then it must be an uncertain transaction in Gab. This means that
the voting power that will be transferred is shared, according to Gab. If that voting power goes
to a malicious bank, then this power was invalid in Gab (as it was shared with a malicious bank),
and is not of our concern. Assume otherwise that it goes to a non-malicious bank, B′. We want
this voting power to support vb. This means that B
′ should support vb. As B′ is non-malicious, it
cannot also support va. As t is an uncertain transaction in Gab that attempts to transfers money
to B′, the corresponding voting power (in Gab) does not support va. The question is if that voting
power still won’t support va when considering the voting power distribution at Ga. The only way
that voting power might indeed support va is if t will cease to be “uncertain” in Ga (but not by
being accepted), so the corresponding amount of money will be no longer shared with B′. This can
be either because t was rejected at a new accept node, or otherwise that another transaction with
the same sequence number was accepted. We shall now prove that both options are impossible.
We start with contradicting the first case, where t is rejected in Ga. Note that t has to be
both accepted in Gb and rejected in Ga by two conflicting accept nodes for the same start node at
which t appears in Gab. Clearly that means that t appears in a malicious bank’s block. For it to
be both accepted and rejected, there must be also two conflicting close nodes, where one of them
sees another conflicting transaction in another block, and the other does not. The result is that
we have two conflicting close nodes with two matching (and conflicting) accept nodes for the same
bank. They all appear in the union of Ga and Gb, and so they also appear in G
′. Each of the accept
nodes cannot have in its subgraph the close node of the other, as this results in invalid graph (a
malicious bank cannot identify its own malice). Thus, they form a pair of ignorant nodes in G′.
The only ignorant nodes in G′ are va and vb. However, those two conflicting accept nodes cannot
be va and vb, as they appear in Ga and Gb which are the subgraphs of va and vb respectively, and
according to our definition of subgraph, a node does not form part of its own subgraph. Thus, it
cannot be that t is accepted in Gb and rejected in Ga.
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The second case is where another transaction of u, different than t but with the same sequence
number, is accepted in Ga. As t gets accepted in Gb, we have two conflicting transactions that get
accepted in G′ (which contains both Ga and Gb). This means that the two start nodes that contain
those conflicting transactions have a matching pair of ignorant close nodes (or else at least one of
the transactions wouldn’t be accepted). However, the only ignorant pair in G′ are va and vb, and
from the same reasoning above, those ignorant close nodes cannot be va and vb themselves.
Recall that we considered above the valid voting power of a user (u) whose (non-malicious)
bank (B) supports va. We have seen above that if some of its voting power will support vb according
to Gb, then it won’t support va in Ga.
The next case is if B supports neither va nor vb. In this case the voting power of u in Gab
couldn’t support va nor vb, as B doesn’t support them. The question is if that voting power might
later support both of them – va in Ga and vb in Gb. This is only possible if u has a transaction
that transfers money to a bank, B′′, that supports both. This is true because (1) two conflicting
transactions cannot be accepted, as it requires an ignorant pair of close nodes, and the only such
pair that exist is the pair of va and vb, and (2) two consequent transactions of the same user cannot
be accepted, because the start node that contains the later transaction must know the accept node
that accepted the first transaction, and so the block that accepts the second transaction is a new
block in Ga or Gb (both its start node and accept node don’t appear in Gab), which we proved to
be impossible. If that B′′ supports both va and vb, then it is malicious (as non malicious banks can
support at most one of them). If the transaction that transfers the money to B′′ does not appear
in B, then it is an uncertain transaction in Gab, and then that voting power is considered invalid
in Gab, and is not of our concern. Assume otherwise, that this transaction appears in a block of B.
For this voting power to support both va according to Ga and vb according to Gb, a corresponding
accept node must appear both in Ga and in Gb. As B is not malicious, it can have only one such
accept node, that can appear at most in one of Ga or Gb (or else it would appear also in Gab).
Thus, at most one of va or vb can be supported by this voting power.
The result is that the valid voting power from Gab of every user that sits in non-malicious bank
can support at most one of va or vb (in Ga and Gb respectively). This is what we claimed, and so
the total supporting voting power is less than 4/3, and at least one of va and vb cannot be valid.
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